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Abstract 
In this paper we use insights from organizational economics and financial regulation to study 
the optimal architecture of supervision.  We suggest that the new architecture should revolve 
around the following principles: (i) banking, securities and insurance supervision should be 
further integrated; (ii) macro prudential supervisory function must be in the hands of the 
central bank; (iii) the relation between macro and micro supervisors must be articulated 
through a management by exception system involving direct authority of the macro 
supervisor over enforcement and allocation of tasks; (iv) given the difficulty of measuring 
output on supervisory tasks, the systemic risk supervisor must necessarily be more 
accountable and less independent than Central Banks are on their monetary task; (v) the 
supervisory agency cannot rely on high powered incentives to motivate supervisors, and must 
rely on culture instead; (vi) the supervisor must limit its reliance on self regulation; and (vii) 
the international system should substitute the current loose, networked structure for a more 
centralized and hierarchical one.  
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Introduction: Financial Crisis and the Organization of Supervision 
Policy-makers have concluded that the recent financial crisis resulted in part from an insuffi-
cient focus on systemic risks. To deal with such problem, the G20 decided to push for the 
creation of systemic risk supervisors. In this paper, we discuss the optimal organization of 
such authority under the light of the organizational economics literature. We then use our 
analysis to discuss current reform proposals. These include, in Europe, the establishment of a 
European System of Financial Supervision with three authorities (revamped Lamfalussy Lev-
el 3 committees1) and the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board or ESRC under the 
aegis of the ECB, based upon the recommendations of the De Larosière Report. In the UK, 
the Financial Services Act2 introduced a Council for Financial Stability and the new Gov-
ernment is proposing a radical overhaul of the regulatory structure that will see the powers of 
the Bank of England substantially expanded and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) ceas-
ing to exist in its current form.3 And in the US, new financial legislation will establish inter 
alia a Financial Services Oversight Council and will give the Federal Reserve System re-
sponsibility for the regulation of systemically significant firms.4 In our paper we focus on the 
architecture of the system and not on the content of the specific regulations concerning li-
quidity, risk taking, capital requirements and other rules that have been addressed by several 
reports,5 national legislative initiatives, EU and international proposals. 
We are mindful that all existing architectures, independently of their specific charac-
teristics, performed poorly at their mission. Whether twin peaks (like in the Netherlands), 
fragmented (like in the US), unitary (like in the United Kingdom with the FSA) or separated 
(like in France), most advanced countries suffered a severe hit to their financial systems. 
While to some extent that may mean that the architecture does not matter, since it was not a 
cause of the crisis, we do believe, however that the institutional design is important for the 
resolution of the crisis and for the establishment of a more effective framework of supervi-
sion, systemic risk control and crisis management going forward. 
The terms supervision and regulation are conceptually different, even though many 
commentators use them interchangeably. Supervision has to do with monitoring and en-
forcement, and regulation with rule-making. Crisis management refers to the instruments 
available to the authorities to confront crisis, in particular lender of last resort assistance, de-
posit insurance and insolvency proceedings.  
                                                     
1 For a summary of the tasks of these Committees see Appendix 9 of report of the House of Lords' European 
Union Committee on ‘The Future of EU financial regulation and supervision’ published on June 17, 2009 avail-
able at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/106/106i.pdf  
2 On 19 November 2009 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, introduced the Financial Services 
Bill into Parliament, and received Royal Assent in April 2010. The Financial Services Act 2010 is available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/pdf/ukpga_20100028_en.pdf  
3See Speech at The Lord Mayor’s Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London by The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, The Rt Hon George Osborne MP, at Mansion House on 16 June 2010, available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm  
4 The US Treasury published a White Paper on ‘Financial Regulatory Reform, a New Foundation’ in June 2009, 
<http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf>. The House of Representatives, led by Bar-
ney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Chairman, passed a Bill (entitled ‘Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009’) on December 11, 2009 by a 223-202 vote. See 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.4173:> The Senate bill, unveiled on March 16, 2010 under 
the name 'Restoring American Financial Stability Act' has been led by Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Se-
nate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and was passed by the US Senate on 20 May 2010. See 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/FinancialReformSummary231510FINAL.pdf Following the House-
Senate Finance Bill Reconciliation process the new legislation is expected to be enacted on 4 July 2010. 
5 See e.g., Brunnemaer’s et al. “Geneva report” (2009), Paul Volcker’s et al. G30 Report and, the de Larosière 
(2008) report. The latter also covers architectural issues extensively. 
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In designing a new architecture, we must take into account the goals of this architec-
ture. Financial stability is the ultimate goal of supervision, regulation and crisis management. 
Yet, supervision is designed to meet also other goals, such as consumer protection, market 
integrity and prevention of fraud (depending on the type of financial institution subject to 
oversight). Regulation is also driven by these ‘supervisory objectives’ and other considera-
tions such as fair competition or the needs of a single market. And crisis management has al-
so objectives of its own, which tend to vary from country to country (e.g. minimization of 
costs to the FDIC/taxpayers is a goal in the USA) and across institutions (with differential 
treatment of debtors and creditors in the case of bankruptcy).  
The principles for a new financial architecture that we propose affect three very dif-
ferent realities in the US, UK and Euro area, which we describe first.  
United States. The US is a single monetary area with a single currency, combined 
with an extremely fragmented supervisory landscape and a complex regulatory system based 
upon federal law (financial laws enacted by Congress), state law (laws enacted by state legis-
latures, particularly relevant in terms of insurance companies), regulation by agencies (the 
Fed and the SEC have rule-making powers) and self-regulation (in the field of securities, the 
rules of the SROs), features which are to remain in the expected new legislation. 
Decentralization in the US runs deep in the fabric of the country and its constitutional 
tradition. It is both geographic – under its federalist structure the powers of the states are very 
important – and functional, with the allocation of authority to narrowly focused agencies. The 
existence of multiple regulators, with sometimes overlapping roles, often allows firms to 
choose their regulator. Banking in the USA is subject both to federal law and to state law, 
with several supervisory authorities at the federal level (the Federal Reserve System, the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation6), and 
at the state level. The securities industry is subject to a combination of federal law and self-
regulation (with some elements of state law). The Securities and Exchange Commission is a 
federal agency which oversees the exchanges and administers the federal system for the reg-
istration of new issues of securities.7 The exchanges are self-regulatory organizations with 
powers to promulgate rules for its member firms and listed companies. The Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) was created in July 2007 through the consolidation of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the member regulation, enforcement 
and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange. It also performs market regula-
tion under contract for the NASDAQ Stock Market, the American Stock Exchange, the Inter-
national Securities Exchange and the Chicago Climate Exchange.8 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - which introduced sweeping reforms with regard to 
corporate governance - did not change much the regulatory structure of US securities mar-
kets. Investment companies (including mutual funds) are regulated almost exclusively at the 
federal level by the SEC since the enactment of the 1940 Investment Company Act and the 
                                                     
6The FDIC has ‘three hats’ as supervisor, insurer and receiver of failed banks.  
7 The Securities Act of 1933 established a federal system for the registration of new issues of securities, and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, created a new federal agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission. Fol-
lowing the stock market crash of 1929, these pieces of legislation were enacted to promote stability and confi-
dence in capital markets and to protect investors in view of the shortcomings and inadequacies of the state ‘blue 
sky’ laws. The reason why state securities statutes were known as ‘blue sky’ laws is because some lawmakers 
believed that ‘if securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in the state 
but the blue sky’.  See Howell E Jackson and Edward L Symons, Regulation of Financial Institutions, (St. Paul, 
Minn.: West Group, 1999), 655-662 and 751-755. 
8 FINRA is involved in registering industry participants, examining securities firms, regulating markets and 
writing rules. A summary of its activities can be found at http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm  
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1940 Investment Advisers Act.9 Insurance in the USA remains a matter of state law since the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, though pension funds are subject to federal law since the 
enactment of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) in 1974. The US financial 
regulatory landscape also comprises other regulators, such as the Commodities Future Trad-
ing Commission for financial derivatives (commodity futures and options).  
The failure to provide adequate supervision of large sectors of the financial market 
has triggered a process of legislative reform. Amongst the “architectural” issues considered in 
the legislation (a somewhat watered-down version of some earlier proposals10) are: the pow-
ers to the Federal Reserve System with regard to the supervision of the largest bank holding 
companies and other systemically significant financial firms, the establishment of a resolution 
authority or new resolution procedures to allow FDIC to unwind failing systemically signifi-
cant financial institutions, the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (or a Bu-
reau housed under the Fed) and a Financial Services Oversight Council, some modest con-
solidation (the Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS will disappear), more coordination between 
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and CFTC (Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission) and others.11 To us – and this is a fast evolving target – the final outcome of the 
legislative reform in the US will be a fragmented and “multi-peaked” system. Plus ça 
change? 
United Kingdom. From 1997 to 2010, the United Kingdom presented a unified pic-
ture in terms of supervision, with the transfer of supervision away from the Bank of England 
and the establishment of a single supervisory agency, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
governed by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. However, the relationships be-
tween the Bank of England (which provides lender of last resort assistance), the FSA (the su-
pervisor) and the Treasury (responsible for the fiscal costs of bail-outs) which had been spelt 
out in a Memorandum of Understanding in 1997, became the subject of much criticism fol-
lowing the Northern Rock episode in September 2007.12 The inadequacy of the UK system to 
confront financial crisis led to the new Banking Act 2009 and to the establishment of a spe-
cial resolution regime (SRR) to deal with troubled and failing banks in which the Bank of 
England plays a key role. However, the structure of supervision remained intact under the 
Labour Government. It took the election of a new Government in May 2010 to change this. In 
a policy reversal, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat (Con-Lib) coalition Government 
has condemned the model of the single regulator, a regulatory model which has inspired re-
forms in many other jurisdictions, to history. The new Chancellor, George Osborne, an-
nounced a radical redrawing of financial regulation on 16 June 2010. The powers of the Bank 
of England are to be substantially expanded (with the Governor of the Bank of England to 
                                                     
9 Hedge funds are not required to register with the SEC as investment companies under the Investment Compa-
ny Act of 1940. In the past, hedge fund advisers were not required to register under the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940. However, in December of 2004, the SEC issued a final rule and rule amendments requiring certain 
hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers under the Act. See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-
2333.htm New rules affecting hedge funds are also expected in the new US financial legislation. 
10 Some academics – such as Howell Jackson – have advocated the need for consolidation of the regulatory 
agencies, and the establishment of a systemic risk authority. See Howell Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the 
Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States, Howell E. Jackson, Harvard Law School, 
November 12, 2008, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-19, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1300431. In the words of Jackson, ‘the Obama administra-
tion is apparently choosing to retain our existing highly fragmented system of sectoral regulation but simulta-
neously to super-impose a “twin-peak” approach with the Federal Reserve Board gaining a systemic risk over-
sight function (sometimes called macro-prudential oversight) and the new Consumer Financial Products Com-
mission’. See Howell Jackson, ‘Regulatory Reform in the New World’, remarks at the Hart Seminar in London 
on 16 June 2009 
11 The final picture will depend upon the legislation that is expected to be adopted on 4 July 2010. Above note 4. 
12 See The Turner Review at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Corporate/turner/index.shtml  
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chair a new Financial Policy Committee within the Bank and a new Prudential Regulatory 
Authority to supervise banks and insurers), while the Financial Services Authority will cease 
to exist in its current form, with its powers divided between the Bank of England, a new Pru-
dential Regulatory Authority, a new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority and an 
Economic Crime Agency.13 This supervisory and regulatory overhaul is expected to be com-
pleted in 2012.14 
The Bank of England has a clear mandate with regard to monetary policy, and since 
the Banking Act 2009, it also has a mandate for financial stability as well as crisis manage-
ment responsibilities - the Special Resolution Regime - to confront troubled banks. With the 
new Government proposals, the supervisory powers of the Bank of England will be further 
expanded both with regard to macro prudential supervision as well as micro prudential super-
vision. 
European Union. The ‘architecture’ of financial supervision in the EU is currently 
characterized by three principles: decentralization, co-operation and segmentation. These 
principles which inform the Lamfalussy structure (see Figure 1) also characterize the new 
structure, based upon the proposals outlined in the De Larosière Report (see Figure 2), further 
analyzed below. In the EU prudential supervision remains decentralized at the level of the 
Member States, based upon the principle of home country control, combined with mutual 
recognition on the basis of prior regulatory harmonization. The fact that some EU Member 
States have adopted the euro, while others retain their national currencies and national mone-
tary policies has significant implications for the purposes of our paper. In the euro-zone, the 
abandonment of the coincidence between the area of jurisdiction of monetary policy and the 
area of jurisdiction of supervision is a major novelty brought about by the advent of European 
Monetary Union.15 Since the launch of the euro in January 1999, the European Central Bank 
is in charge of the monetary policy of the countries which have adopted the single currency, 
while responsibility for supervision remains decentralized, which means that each EU coun-
try (eurozone or non-eurozone) organizes supervision as it wishes. Some rely on the Central 
Bank to do everything (like the Czech Republic), some others have a single supervisory au-
thority different from the central bank (like Sweden), others have separate authorities for 
banking, securities and insurance (like Spain) and there are other ‘permutations’, like the 
Dutch twin peaks approach of having the central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB) as the 
institution responsible for prudential supervision in the pursuit of financial stability and a 
separate Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) as the authority responsible for conduct of 
business supervision. 16 (Both supervisory authorities cover the full cross-sector width of fi-
nancial markets, i.e. all institutions in banking, securities, insurance and pensions). 
                                                     
13 Above note 3. 
14 See FSA press release, ‘FSA Chairman welcomes Chancellor's plans for regulatory reform’ of 16  
June 2010, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2010/100.shtml 
15 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘EMU and Banking Supervision’, Lecture at the London School of Economics 
(24 February 1999), <http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/events/index.html>, also published in Charles Goodhart (ed.), Which 
Lender of Last Resort For Europe? Ch 1 (Central Banking Publications: London, 2000). 
16 See ‘Recent Developments in Supervisory Structures in EU and Acceding Countries’, ECB Monthly Bulletin 
May 2006, http://www.ecb.int/pub/odf/other/report_on_supervisory_structuresen.pdf  
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Figure 1: Current Financial Architecture in Europe 
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In Europe, the basis of the reform proposals is the so-called Larosière Report, a Re-
port by a high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Laro-
sière, presented to the European Commission, on 25 February 2009.17 The report was en-
dorsed by the European Commission in May 2009 and by the European Council in June 
2009. On 23 September 2009 the EU Commission presented legislative proposals to imple-
ment its recommendations (see Figure 2). These included proposals for regulations establish-
ing a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) and a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), as well as a 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and a decision entrusting the ECB with specific tasks 
concerning the ERSB.18 In October 2009 the Commission proposed a directive amending a 
number of directives in respect of the EBA, the EIOPA and the ESMA. ECOFIN reached a 
broad consensus regarding the main features of the ESRB at its meeting on 20 October 2009 
and on 2 December 2009, ECOFIN approved that creation of the new European Supervisory 
Authorities19 Subject to approval by the European Parliament, the ESRB should take up its 
duties at the beginning of 2011. The ESRB will have to identify risks to financial stability 
and, where appropriate, issue warnings or recommendations of a general or specific nature 
concerning the Community as a whole, individual Member States or groups of Member 
States. Although ESRB recommendations will not be legally binding, it is expected that the 
                                                     
17 De Larosière report at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf>  
18 The legal basis of the regulations is Art. 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
which was Article 95 of the EC Treaty and the legal basis of the decision granting certain tasks to the ECB is 
Article 127(5) TFEU, which was Article 105 (5) EC Treaty.  
19 See <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1347&type=HTML> Commission 
adopts legislative proposals to strengthen financial supervision in Europe 
(see MEMO/09/404 and MEMO/09/405), 23 September 2009. The Ecofin Council on 2 December 2009 ap-
proved the creation of the new three European Supervisory Authorities, which together with the European Sys-
tem Risk Board (for which broad political agreement was reached on 20 October 2009) form the new EU super-
visory structure. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111706.pdf>.  
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addressees of recommendations will not remain passive towards a risk which has been identi-
fied and are expected to react in some way. The ESRB might decide on a case by case basis 
whether warnings or recommendations should be made public. 
 
Figure 2. New Financial Architecture 
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This type of coordination costs are non trivial as exemplified by the AIG supervision 
system. In the words of Fed Chairman Bernanke “AIG built up its concentrated exposure to 
the subprime mortgage market largely out of the sight of its functional regulators.”21 The 
AIG-Financial Products exposure was mainly handled from London, hidden from its insur-
ance regulators and the Fed, and essentially only supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion. Thus the OTS, a small regulator in charge of the Savings and Loan industry was tasked 
with supervising what was a key cog in the global financial system.22 The ability of AIG to 
conduct a large scale scam makes most clear the risks of multiple competing regulators with 
overlapping responsibilities: a sophisticated financial institution may engage in a particularly 
insidious type of regulatory arbitrage, whereby it ‘chooses’ its own regulator, one that is un-
likely to have the relevant knowledge and expertise.23.24 
Thus the coordination costs derived from having multiple authorities are likely to be 
large. How large are the gains from specialization? These gains are unlikely to be large in the 
financial knowledge domain, as the substantive valuation, risk analysis, liquidity and solven-
cy issues are the same in insurance, securities and banking. Thus on grounds of division of 
labor, the balance is strongly in favor of an integrated authority.  
A second possible argument for diversity is to encourage innovation. Having multiple 
regulators is like having several independent screens, where behaviors are accepted as long as 
they are accepted by at least one screen. In contrast, a centralized structure is like one with 
successive (not alternative screens) where only projects or ideas accepted by those successive 
screens are accepted (Sah and Stiglitz (1986)). If innovation matters, a decentralized structure 
will be preferred (Kane (1984), Romano (1997, 2001), Kupiec and White (1996)].) Converse-
ly, the centralized system generates too little innovation, and leads to fossilization.25 In our 
view, recent events show that financial innovation is of limited value relative to the risk en-
gendered. A more centralized and hierarchical system is needed. 
A final argument for multiple agencies is adaptation to change. If there are multiple 
regulators some of them may prove better adapted to a change in the environment. On the 
other hand, if a coordinated radical change through the system is needed, a single regulator 
will be better able to implement it.26 
                                                     
21 “Second, the AIG situation highlights the need for strong, effective consolidated supervision of all systemical-
ly important financial firms. AIG built up its concentrated exposure to the subprime mortgage market largely out 
of the sight of its functional regulators. More-effective supervision might have identified and blocked the extra-
ordinarily reckless risk-taking at AIG-FP.” Ben Bernanke’s testimony to Committee on Financial Services, US 
House of Representatives, March 24, 2009. 
22 AIG had bought a savings and loan- this was the reason the OTS was the regulator.  
23 According to the former counsel of the Senate Banking Committee , after the 1999 Gramm Leach Biley Act 
which allowed insurance, banking and securities firms into each others territory "There was a stampede by 
commercial and financial firms to get a thrift charter so that OTS could be their consolidated supervisor." (Bart 
Dzivi, a former counsel to the Senate Banking Committee and now a financial-institutions lawyer in Northern 
California),  
24 The literature argues that a single, large supervisory authority is better able to attract, develop, and maintain 
professional staff expertise. [Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999), Abrams and Taylor (2001)]. This has not been 
found to be the case in other domains, where specialized agencies can offer a congenial environment to the ex-
perts in that field irrespective of size (consider the CIA and NSA in intelligence, with clearly differentiated do-
mains and different structures), and we do not expect it to be the case here. 
25 A variant of this argument would consider learning -- multiple supervisory authorities may adopt different 
approaches to supervision which can yield valuable information that would not be generated by a single supervi-
sor. [Llewellyn (1999)]. 
26 The existing literature has also argued a single regulator may be preferred in other grounds such as conflict 
resolution (a single regulator is better able to resolve conflicts that emerge between different regulatory goals 
because of lower “frictions” in deciding and implementing resolutions. [Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999), Wall 
and Eisenbeis (2000)]), accountability (a single regulator will be more transparent and accountable than multiple 
regulators, and may find it more difficult to “pass the buck” if it makes a mistake. [Briault (1999), Llewellyn 
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The empirical evidence on the question is small. Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox 
(2002) find that countries with multiple supervisors tend to have lower capital adequacy ra-
tios and hence higher insolvency risk (they take this as evidence of the “competition in laxi-
ty”).  
Our discussion here suggests that there are some limited pluses to a system with mul-
tiple agencies, but these pluses are in this case clearly overwhelmed by the coordination costs 
we have identified. Both the US and the EU area have a large multiplicity of actors already, 
particularly given the ‘federal’ structure of both areas. Given that many supervised financial 
institutions operate in all three of those areas, the argument suggests that insurance, securities 
and banking supervisors should be further integrated.27 
Principle 2. Systemic supervision must be under the purview of the central 
bank 
The role of the central bank is the major issue at stake in this organizational structure, in par-
ticular, whether supervision should be a responsibility of the central bank. With or without 
direct supervisory responsibilities, a central bank has a responsibility for financial stability, 
because of its lender of last resort role.  
The debate about the supervisory responsibilities of central banks is linked to the dis-
cussion of the goals and history of central banks. The Federal Reserve System was set up in 
1913 ‘to establish a more effective supervision of banking’,28 following the banking crises of 
the 19th and 20th centuries. The Fed conceives of its monetary policy as having been largely 
grafted onto its supervisory functions, and regards its supervisory and regulatory functions as 
a prerequisite and complement to its monetary policy responsibilities. These origins, as well 
as the experience of the Great Depression, help explain the decisiveness and extensiveness 
with which the Fed has reacted to the financial crisis from the summer of 2007 to date. 
The more recent emphasis on stable money as the primary objective of monetary poli-
cy - the driving force of central bank independence in many countries around the World in 
the 1980s and 1990s - was often accompanied in some countries (such as the UK and Austral-
ia) by a move away from supervisory functions . While there are important grounds for the 
creation of a separate agency, we believe that the reasons for combining both functions are 
more important. 
First, and most importantly, the lender of last resort function can only be undertaken 
by a central bank. The involvement of central banks in financial stability originates in their 
role as monopolist suppliers of fiat money and in their role as bankers’ bank. Only the ulti-
mate supplier of money can provide the necessary stabilizing function in a nationwide scram-
ble for liquidity, as the financial crisis has amply evidenced, with conventional and non-
conventional monetary policy operations (quantitative easing and others). This is a clear les-
son of the crisis in the UK, where the problems of Northern Rock caught the Bank of England 
by surprise: having timely information is particularly crucial during financial crises and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1999), Abrams and Taylor (2001)]) and transparency (a system with a single regulator is simpler for financial 
institutions and consumers to understand. [Llewellyn (1999)].); while worrying that a single regulator may have 
excessive power (Taylor (1995), Kane (1996), Briault (1999), Llewellyn (1999)]). 
27 Our recommendations in this regard have found support in recent proposals of the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, suggesting that the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets authority (ESMA) working 
together through an improved joint coordinating committee should be all located in Frankfurt so as to attain 
much closer collaboration among them. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/042-
74361-130-05-20-907-20100510IPR74360-10-05-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm 10 May 2010. 
28 See Introduction to the Federal Reserve Act of 23 December 1913. 
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best way to ensure access is to have daily supervision by the central bank, as the literature has 
noted.29  
Second, we have learned in this crisis that monetary policy not only affects inflation 
rates, but the price (and thus the amount) of risk taking. An excessively accommodating Fed-
eral Reserve convinced actors that they would be saved from their folly (the famous ‘Green-
span put’) and lead to excessive risk taking. Thus, those in charge of monetary policy need to 
know the amount of risk and instability in the system. Moreover, the absence of stable prices 
harms the stability of the financial system, while financial fragility in turn, negatively affects 
monetary stability.  
Third, the prestige and independence of central banks enhances their ability to enforce 
actions (Giddy (1994), Lastra, (1992), Abrams and Taylor (2001)), as well as to recruit and 
retain the best staff. 
Of course, extracting synergies never comes without organizational costs. One key 
problem with combining tasks has to do with the difficulty in providing adequate incentives 
and measurement on the stability task. The measurement of the success of a bank on its cen-
tral banking functions is pretty straightforward. There is one goal, price stability, one instru-
ment, monetary policy. There are also a relatively small number of people (the gover-
nor/chairman and the members of the executive board/monetary policy committee)30 in 
charge of that task. In contrast, regulation and supervision try to achieve multiple goals (fi-
nancial stability, investor/consumer protection, conduct of business and others), with a wide 
range of instruments: licensing requirements, macro and micro prudential supervision, finan-
cial stability reviews, lender of last resort operations and other crisis management procedures, 
and there are multiple agencies involved the central bank, the ministry of finance or treasury, 
the supervisory agency or agencies. Moreover, supervision typically relies on a large number 
of staff to perform examinations and other tasks. 
The clarity of the metrics used to measure success by central banks on their inflation 
fighting mission makes it hard to combine these tasks with the supervisory task. As Holmo-
strom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) have pointed out, in an environment with multiple tasks that 
are observable with different difficulty, the setting of clear performance criteria in the tasks 
that are easily measurable deflects agents’ efforts away from the tasks that may be valuable 
but are more difficult to measure. That is, we can expect a central bank with a clear inflation 
target objective to subordinate success on its financial supervision mission to its inflation tar-
geting performance. Conversely, a financial system without a target but with political pres-
sure on stability may pursue monetary policy that is too expansionary in order to minimize 
the adverse effects on bank earnings and credit quality.31 A final negative spillover between 
both tasks is reputational. If the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and bank 
failures occur, public perception of its credibility in conducting monetary policy could be ad-
versely affected. A related reputational risk concerns its independence, the wider is the role of 
the central bank, the more subject it could become to political pressures, thus threatening its 
independence.32 
                                                     
29 See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993), Goodhart (1995), Haubrich (1996), Briault (1999), Peek, Rosengren, 
and Tootle (1999), Abrams and Taylor (2001). 
30 Though the central bank also needs a team of economists to do the forecasting, to study the transmission me-
chanisms of monetary policy, etcetera. 
31See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993, 1995), Haubrich (1996), Briault (1999), Abrams and Taylor (2001). 
32 See Haubrich (1996), Briault (1999), Abrams and Taylor (2001). Indeed one of us (Lastra (1996)) has argued 
that the Bundesbank was not given direct responsibility for prudential banking supervision in order to remove 
any possible threat to the credibility of its price stability target. 
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Early empirical research into these questions generally supported the argument that 
there were important organizational and incentive costs of combining both tasks and sug-
gested that central banks should take a narrow focus and not undertake bank supervision.33 
The recent crisis, however, decisively shifts the argument against the previous consensus. We 
learnt again, in the Northern Rock debacle which caught the Bank of England completely un-
prepared, that the Central banks absence from supervision or closer involvement in the pur-
suit of financial stability has enormous costs. The problem is however that extracting the 
clear synergies between supervision and monetary policy requires finding solutions that re-
duce these organizational costs.  
The recent consensus points to an intermediate solution, which bundles macro-
prudential supervision with monetary policy and segregates micro-prudential supervision. 
According to the House of Lords Report on the Future or EU Supervision and Regulation,34 
‘macro-prudential supervision is the analysis of trends and imbalances in the financial system 
and the detection of systemic risks that these trends may pose to financial institutions and the 
economy. The focus of macro-prudential supervision is the safety of the financial and eco-
nomic system as a whole, the prevention of systemic risk. Micro-prudential supervision is the 
day-to-day supervision of individual financial institutions’. 
In our view, splitting macro prudential supervision and allocating it to the Central 
Bank makes it possible to capture the main synergies while avoiding most of the organiza-
tional costs.35 The multitasking, informational economies of scope and reputational issues 
that we discussed above apply typically to micro-prudential supervision. 36 On the other hand, 
the arguments against separation, namely the central bank's lender of last resort role (espe-
cially in the case of systemic failure), its oversight function concerning the payment system 
and the need for consistency between monetary policy and prudential supervision, are more 
related to macro-prudential supervision. Thus combining only the macro-prudential supervi-
sion tasks with Central Banking seems to provide important benefits while avoiding the main 
costs identified above. 
There are two initial difficulties with such combination. First, the critical question is 
the extent to which this ‘macro’ role would be sufficient to avoid the next financial crisis. 
This crisis is a also a micro-crisis, after all—knowing how AIG and some of the mono-line 
                                                     
33 For instance, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) and Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) use cross-country data to 
find a positive correlation between the rate of inflation and the central bank having responsibility for both mone-
tary policy and supervision. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) note that independent central banks, which are 
generally better at fighting inflation, are also more likely to not have responsibility for banking supervision. 
Ioannidou (2005) focuses solely on the US, where the central bank is one of three federal-level bank supervi-
sors. Using data on formal actions taken by federal bank supervisors against banks, this paper suggests that the 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy responsibilities affect its supervisory behaviour. In particular, when the fed-
eral funds rate increases, it relaxes its supervisory posture as a form of compensation to the banks. Feldman, 
Kim, Miller and Schmidt (2002) use data for the US banking system to test the hypothesis that a central bank 
with direct access to confidential supervisory data can enhance its macroeconomic forecasting ability, and the-
reby bolster its monetary policy efforts. However, they find little empirical support for the "access to informa-
tion" argument. 
34See <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/106/106i.pdf> . One of us [Lastra] 
acted as Specialist Adviser to the House of Lords during the inquiry and contributed to the writing of the Report. 
35 The distinction between macro-prudential supervision (the supervision of the financial system at large) and 
micro-prudential supervision (the supervision of individual financial institutions) has been adopted inter alia by 
the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, pub-
lished on 25 February 2009 (the De Larosière Report) and by the Report on ‘The Fundamental Principles of 
Financial Regulation’, Geneva Reports on the World Economy (2009) by Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew 
Crocket, Charles Goodhart, Avinaush Persaud and Hyun Shin.  
36 See Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Super-
vision be Separated?’ 47 Oxford University Papers 539 (1995). 
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insurers were operating required an intimate knowledge of their behavior that could only 
come from being their (micro-prudential) supervisor. On the other hand, there may be some 
tools (such as extended monetary type aggregates, the volume of Repurchase agreements out-
standing, the amount of short term commercial paper), that could give advanced warning of 
‘frothy’ conditions.  
Second there is a specific problem in Europe: that of jurisdictional domain. Not all the 
countries in the EU belong to EMU.37 The purview of the financial supervisor must be Eu-
rope wide, but the European Central bank only includes some of the countries in Europe. This 
is particularly important in the case of the UK, which is Europe’s key financial center.38  
Principle 3: Management by Exception should govern the relation between 
micro and macro supervision 
The problem with the ‘vertical specialization’ between macro and micro prudential supervi-
sion is articulating this relation. This involves two problems: making sure that the right type 
of problems go to the right authority. And making sure that the decisions of the macro author-
ity are in fact executed- giving teeth to these proposals.39 
On the first issue, the standard solution in the business world (analyzed in Garicano, 
2000) is Management by Exception (MBE). Essentially, the idea is that every problem (for 
example, a bank decision, or a bank portfolio) arrives initially to the micro authority and is 
dealt with by it unless it is classed as exceptional. If it is an exception, then the problem (a 
risk or the bearer of the risk) must be passed up to the next authority (the Macro-Prudential 
supervisor). Of course, the difficulty, both in firms and in this context, is ensuring that the 
‘lower level’ agent (or agency, here) is willing to pass ‘upwards’ the problems that are not 
truly in his domain. Financial incentives may be used for this purpose in firms or even in 
markets,40 but not in this context.  
Authority is also needed in the case of the enforcement of the actions of these super-
visors. In the particular context of the European Architecture, it is necessary that the Euro-
pean Financial Supervisory authority or authorities be endowed with authority to overrule and 
direct the National Supervisors, as well as to determine the allocation of problems to each 
level. This is how the Antitrust system currently works, with (1) independent agencies in each 
country as well as (2) a central agency for cases that reach across borders, the DG Competi-
tion, and a (3) clear hierarchical system of allocation of cases as well as a clear (4) direct en-
forcement authority of the EU institution that directly applies in each member state. 
Beyond the allocation of decision making, it is necessary to ensure good communica-
tion between micro and macro supervision. But there are two main obstacles to information 
sharing among agencies - bounded rationality, resulting in misunderstandings due to the use 
of different languages or ‘codes’ by the different agencies, and conflicting incentives.41 First, 
organizations choose (evolve) different languages or codes as a result of the specific issues 
they deal with (see Cremer et al. 2007)—evolving specialized codes allows them to improves 
                                                     
37 See De Larosière report (2009) and House of Lords Report (2009). 
38 The De Larosière Report suggested that all EU central banks (the composition of the General Council of the 
ECB, the one organ that includes the membership of all EU central banks, not just those of the euro-area) should 
be part of the European System Risk Council.  
39 Both of these issues are avoided in the De Larosière (2009 report). 
40 Referral payments are used in the law with this purpose, see Garicano and Santos ( 2002) 
41 Information flows also present the challenge of the jurisdictional domain, since supervisors must exchange 
information across national boundaries. They failed to do this with regard to the size and riskiness of the securi-
tized market and the credit derivatives market, to cite two glaring examples. 
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communication within the organization but tends to isolate it from other organizations. Con-
sider the AIG fiasco. As Ben Bernanke has put it “There was no regulatory oversight because 
there was a gap in the system.” Insurance activities were subject to regulation from state in-
surance regulators, and the way such activities are ‘coded’ is as insurance. As a result, the 
form of the earnings and financial statements reported by AIG was just inadequate for non-
insurance regulators to understand its exposure; since the provision of financial products was 
one of its main activities, this miscommunication proved extremely important. 
Second, there are usually strong disincentives to information sharing across organiza-
tions. A turf war is an extreme instance of this. In a turf war, agencies shift resources from 
productive activities to influence activities. This may enable the less productive agency to 
obtain more resources in the future (Skaperdas, 1992). 
We propose three ways to facilitate information sharing. First, the communication ad-
vantages of single organizations can be obtained through the use of centralized and common 
databases (common codes) together with horizontal (rather than hierarchical) communica-
tion.42 Second, organizations, even if separate, should be housed in close proximity to facili-
tate the creation of bonds that facilitate informal sharing. This should be complemented with 
fomenting a ‘sprit de corps’ and identification with the ultimate aim. Third, while explicit 
monetary incentives are unlikely to be used, agents should be rewarded as a function of the 
‘impact’ that their recommendations have on final decisions.  
Principle 4: The supervisor must build a strong culture and rely on subjec-
tive performance, rather than quantitative incentives, to motivate its agents 
How should jobs, decision rights, incentives and accountabilities be established for em-
ployees in a supervisory agency? The key issue is that performance in these tasks is hard to 
measure. Moreover, these tasks have a lot of downside, and little upside- so that little credit is 
received if things go well, and a great deal of scrutiny and criticism received if things go 
bad.43 That means the biases of employees are to take actions that look good and that can be 
easily explained. The job is made particularly difficult by the pro-cyclical nature of some of 
the rules supervisors must enforce. In a falling market, capital rules and market value ac-
counting rules may bring to their knees institutions that would otherwise be considered 
sound, and may force the supervisor to take unnecessarily tough decisions. 
Thus using explicit performance objectives is hard, and likely to distort that perfor-
mance towards easy to measure but meaningless tasks (Baker, 1992). Instead, agents must be 
rewarded through low powered incentives and little ‘objective’ performance measurement, 
using instead the employees’ career to provide long term incentives, and their performance 
evaluated through subjectively, by their hierarchical superiors. 
This of course also creates distortions, since distinguishing the part of the perfor-
mance that is due to random errors or noise from the part that is due to good or bad decisions 
by the agent may be difficult, and this in turn results in a wedge between self-interest and 
agency interest. First, career concerns can provide a spur to herding behavior. As Sharfstein 
and Stein (1990) have argued, an agent who discovers that his opinion does not coincide with 
that of his colleagues may infer that his information is bad, and prefer to copy what others say 
rather than offer his own view. Also, public employees typically compete against each other 
                                                     
42 See Crémer, Garicano and Prat (2007) for a study of the cost and benefits of horizontal communication 
through common codes. 
43 That supervision is a thankless task is a point made by Charles Goodhart, ‘The Organizational Structure of 
Banking Supervision’, (London: LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper 127, 2000) 30-31. 
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for pay and promotion and they may try to sabotage each other (Lazear, 1989) by concealing 
information or providing false information. Or they may squander resources on “influence 
activities” that seek to manipulate the perception of their performance by superiors or other-
wise gain the favor of those superiors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1990). 
Avoiding this kind of careerist behavior is important to have a well functioning su-
pervisory agency. Creating a sense of identification in employees with the agency can help to 
align individual and organizational incentives and thus reduce this type of principal-agent 
conflict (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Military organizations for example endeavor to create 
an esprit de corps that substitutes for financial incentives to good performance.  
Principle 5. The macro supervisor should be less independent than central 
banks are now in their monetary policy responsibilities 
Over the last two decades, the establishment around the world of independent regulatory 
agencies has ignited a debate on how to reconcile technocratic independent institutions with 
the demands of democratic legitimacy. How can giving freedom (i.e., independence) to un-
elected officials be reconciled with a society remaining democratic? The answer is: through 
accountability.  
Performance accountability requires that there are objectives or standards (criteria of 
assessment) according to which an action or decision might be assessed. The extent to which 
type of accountability may be preferred can be a function of the type of supervision that is at 
stake (see Prendergast (2002)) In the case of supervision, input or process monitoring should 
be preferred, because as we discussed above, performance or outputs on the supervisory ac-
tivity are hard to measure. The fact that inputs, rather than output monitoring should be cho-
sen also suggests that providing a monetary authority (with a clear performance objective) 
with independence is not the same as providing independence to a supervisor: if delegation 
and output measurement cannot be used, then independence must be more restricted with re-
gard to financial supervision than with regard to monetary policy. 
Transparency is a complement of accountability- information needs to be observed for 
the agent to be made accountable. However, the provision of information is hardly ever a 
neutral account of what happened or of what is happening, as the agent is likely to provide it 
in a self-serving way. Essentially, as Prat (2004) has argued, if the action is transparently ob-
servable, the risk is that agents will behave in a conformist way by doing what is expected of 
them. 44 A related theoretical argument has been made by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2003) 
who argue that too much transparency can actually reduce policy effectiveness. If the central 
bank signal is noisy relatively to private signals, they show, attaching too much weight to the 
noisier signal may distort the quality of the market’s treatment of information. While this ar-
gument is of unclear validity for monetary policy where most relevant information is public 
(Blinder and Wyplosz, 2005), it may be very relevant to supervision, where private informa-
tion is important.  
A second downside of transparency concerns panics. While the macroeconomics lite-
rature (Blinder, 2002, 2004) argues that transparency in the decision making of central banks 
is useful, the need for covert assistance in the case of lender of last resort operations (which is 
recognized in the new Banking Act 2009 in the UK) is of crucial to a crisis, since the belief in 
a panic is self-fulfilling . These considerations put transparency for supervisory decisions in a 
                                                     
44 This is arguably the case also for monetary policy tasks: if minutes of the meetings were published, then 
board members would be more likely to take the actions that are expected of them, such as acting in their na-
tional interest rather than the common interest.  
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different category from transparency for monetary policy decisions, where the arguments are 
overwhelmingly in favor of disclosure. 
Thus our review of the organizational economics and macro literature in indepen-
dence and accountability leads us to three conclusions. First, that the difficulty in making su-
pervisory performance measurable means independence of supervisors should be limited with 
regard to certain supervisory decisions. Second, that input (or process) monitoring rather than 
output monitoring should be preferred. In other words accountability cannot just rely on 
whether crisis are or not taking place; instead, mechanisms must be put in place that ensure 
that supervisors have to explain the actual decisions and the process leading to them. Third, 
transparency, itself a complement of accountability, must be minimized with regard to certain 
crisis-sensitive decisions in a supervisory agency to avoid career based decisions of experts, 
informational distortions by the market and bank panics. 
Principle 6. The macro supervisor must limit its reliance on self-regulation  
Market supervision and regulation, i.e., self-regulation, exercised by market institutions, has 
played a role in the financial system.45 The idea is that financial firms are subject to conti-
nuous monitoring by their competitors, institutional investors, customers, counter-parties, rat-
ing agencies and other private agents. In fact, there is some evidence to support this view: 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) find evidence (pre-crisis!) that countries with government 
policies that promote the private monitoring of banks tend to have better bank performance 
and more stability.46  
This was, however, not the case during this crisis. As Alan Greenspan stated in Con-
gress47 “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect 
shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief… Yes, I’ve found a 
flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that 
fact” 
Why would self-interested agents not self regulate adequately? The problem is moral 
hazard: that banks are not the ones determining these self-regulatory decisions, it is their 
agents, the human being who work at banks. It is by now transparently clear that the bonus 
system combining short run horizons for executives at the banks (bonuses decisions are 
awarded annually) together with the enormous sums at stake mean that executives do not 
have an incentive to self-regulate, but rather to take on excessive risk . It is an asymmetric 
system in which heads I win, tails you lose. This system puts the managers’ own interests 
ahead of the long term interests of the institution (including its very survival as a viable enti-
ty). Moreover, even taking into account the institution’s interest would not be sufficient, as, 
given the LOLR protection given by the state, a manager acting in the interest of the institu-
tion could still act in ways contrary to the financial system as a whole. Essentially, the state 
insurance against losses is an incentive not just for the manager, but for the institution itself 
to gamble. Better corporate governance is thus not a solution to these problems. There is lit-
tle reason a priori to expect self-interested managers to have any incentive to worry about the 
long term consequences of their actions for their own institution and no reason to expect them 
to worry about the financial system as a whole. 
                                                     
45 Lastra (2006), chapter 3. 
46 Also Ferguson (2000) suggests that market information (contained in either bond ratings or equity perfor-
mance) tends to be a better predictor of future banking performance than supervisory information, indicating 
that there is an important role for market self-regulation. 
47 “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation”, The New York Times, October 23, 2008. 
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Principle 7. International supervision must move from a loose network to a 
hierarchical structure 
The international dimension of supervision adds another layer of complexity to the reform of 
the supervisory structures, which require a new ‘international architecture’. This suggests that 
the issues of jurisdictional domain are likely to dominate the debate of the future of the archi-
tecture of financial stability. Calls for the creation of an international financial authority 
(whose powers, relationships with national authorities, legitimacy, and accountability would 
need to be debated carefully ex ante) have been made in response to the current plethora of 
informal bodies, standard –setters (of soft-law) and inadequate institutional structure. Colleg-
es of supervisors address some problems of co-ordination and co-operation, but they are not 
enough to respond to the challenges of global institutions and markets governed by national 
regulation and supervision. 
The current actors in the international financial architecture are organized as a loose 
network of ‘formal’ international financial institutions (IMF, BIS, WTO to the extent that it is 
engaged in trade in financial services), regional financial institutions (notably the ECB) , in-
ternational fora meeting under the auspices of a formal international organisation (such as the 
Financial Stability Forum – renamed Financial Stability Board following the G-20 meeting in 
London in April 2009 - and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), other internation-
al fora (such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions), ‘informal’ inter-
national groupings where international financial issues are discussed (such as the Group of 
Seven, G-7 Group of Ten, G-10 countries, Group of 20, G-20 countries), national central 
banks and ministries of finance or treasuries (which can play a role individually or collective-
ly meeting in an international forum of a formal or informal character), and private financial 
institutions acting on a global scale. This multiplicity of actors and the mushrooming of in-
ternational fora create a very complex network structure.  
In our view, given the rise in systemic risks noted by all the reports on the current sys-
tem and the interconnectedness of the global financial system the way forward must involve 
the substitution of this loose network for a hierarchical structure more akin to the one used in 
the WTO. That is, in the same way as the governance of trade has required a new multilateral 
organism with a clear, hierarchical structure that has substituted the previous morass of bila-
teral relationships, the evolution of the financial system requires the creation of a new multi-
lateral financial body with authority to settle disputes and to impose its decision.48 
A move from a loose network to a hierarchical structure is not without costs. Net-
works structures are generally based on informal relationships, enforced by reciprocity, by 
relational contracts where each agent takes his actions in the knowledge that the relation will 
continue.49 These networks tend to support very thick exchanges of information, as agents 
develop trust; the absence of hierarchical relationships limits the downside of honesty and 
truthful reporting and the scope for ‘yes-men’ type behavior. On the other hand, networks 
have limited ability to enforce decisions. Precisely this absence of hierarchical authority lim-
its the extent to which agents can compel each other to comply with decisions not strictly in 
their own interest. True, relational contracting (the expectation of future cooperation) can do 
a lot; but the more agents involved in the relational contract, and the more complex the struc-
ture, the less likely such a structure will compel this behavior. 
A hierarchy is preferable in this financial context for precisely this reason. Loose 
coordination works only in imposing decisions that are win-win, but will never succeed at 
                                                     
48 See the paper by Michael Gadbaw in this issue. 
49 On this comparison between networks and hierarchies, see Powell (1991). 
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imposing decisions that are better for all but leave one party worse off. A hierarchical au-
thority, one that, like the WTO, is perceived as representative, may be able to do this. The 
International Monetary Fund, for reasons discussed elsewhere,50 is the institution best placed 
to adopt the role of ‘global sheriff’ with regard to international financial stability. 
Conclusions: a New EU Architecture  
We are mindful that any reform proposal for the EU must contend with what is an inevitable 
tension in the current EU structure: a national mandate in prudential supervision, combined 
with a single European currency (which affects all eurozone Member States) and a European 
mandate in the completion of the single market in financial services, which affects all EU 
Member States. Moreover, reformers have to contend with the different jurisdictional areas of 
the EU (27 Member States) and the euro-zone on the other hand (16 Member States). None of 
those issues fall within the purview of our analysis. 
The system until now is quite clear: only monetary policy has been centralized (and 
only for those Member States that have adopted the euro); supervision and crisis management 
have remained for the most part a national competence (the ECB does provide market emer-
gency liquidity assistance, but assistance to individual institutions whether via collateralized 
lines of credit, recapitalization or other forms of support is a national competence).51 Regula-
tion is both national and European, with a large amount of Directives and Regulations provid-
ing a unifying picture with regard to banking and financial regulation in the EU (although 
some rules notably with regard to insolvency proceedings are yet to be harmonized). Padoa-
Schioppa has referred to the current approach as one based on ‘European regulation with na-
tional supervision’.52  
Such a system gets has the advantages of specialization, creativity and innovation, but 
the lack of synergies and coordination may prove costly, especially in a crisis. In this paper 
we have suggested a set of seven principles that must govern the redesign of the system. We 
state them below.  
 
1. The supervision of insurance, banking and securities must be further integrated 
2. Systemic supervision must be under the purview of the central bank 
3. Management by Exception should govern the relation between micro and macro su-
pervision 
4. The supervisor must build a strong culture and rely on subjective performance, rather 
than quantifiable incentives, to motivate agents  
5. The macro supervisor should be less independent than central banks are now in their 
monetary policy responsibilities 
6. The macro supervisor must limit self-regulation to ensure managers act in the interest 
of stakeholders  
7. International supervision must move from a loose network to a hierarchical structure 
 
                                                     
50 See Rosa Lastra, 'The role of the IMF as a global financial authority' European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law (EYIEL) Vol 2 (2011). See also the paper by Gadbaw in this issue. 
51 In accordance with [strict] Treaty provisions, the Commission is advancing the need for European solutions 
both with regard to supervision and crisis management. See e.g., Commission Communication COM(2009)561 
on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector of 20 October 2009 at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0561:FIN:EN:PDF  
52 See Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 8 on 
‘Central Banks and Financial Stability’, 121. 
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Though the new European financial architecture (outlined in Figure 2 above) is a step 
forward in the project of European integration it falls short of the needs of a single market in 
financial services. What Europe needs in banking, is what Europe has in football: national 
rules and supervision for national teams and players and European rules and supervision for 
pan-European players. In short, what we need is a Champions League for Europe’s pan-
European financial institutions, governed by the principles that we have presented in this pa-
per, in particular consolidated and integrated supervision, management by exception and a 
hierarchical structure. 
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